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TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
EDWARD N. POLISHER*

The scope of this article is limited to the discussion of transfers prompted
by motives associated with life and moral obligations; transfers made simultaneously with the execution of a will, or as a part of a plan of testamentary
disposition; transfers of life insurance policies; andlastly, valuation of such
transfers.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR PROVISION

The Federal Estate Tax Statute, since its enactment in 1916, has in-

cluded a provision for the taxation of transfers made during the decedent's
lifetime "in contemplation of death." I This was necessary to prevent evasion
of the estate tax through the medium of inter yivos transfers which were substitutes for testamentary dispositions.2 Prior to the passage of the gift tax
law on June 6, 1932, such inter vivos transfers would have gone entirely taxfree; subsequent to its enactment, the retention of the provision was deemed
necessary in order to prevent avoidance of the difference in rates between the
estate tax and the gift tax on the transfers.
A precise definition of the term "transfers in contemplation of death"
was not contained in the statute or in the Internal Revenue Code. 3 However,
the statute provided that gifts made within two years of death were presumed
to have been made in contemplation of death. Until 1926, this was a rebuttable
presumption and the Treasury had only limited success in establishing inter
vivos transfers as substitutes for testamentary dispositions. The 1926 -Revenue
Act converted this provision into a conclusive two-year presumption. 4 The
latter was held to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, as being in contravention of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 Thereupon, the Revenue Act of 1932 restored the rebuttable presumption which has remained in force until the present time. 6
STATUTE AND REGULATIONS

Section 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that there shall be
* Member of the Philadelphia Bar; author, ESTATE PLANNING AND EsTATE TAX
SAVING (2d ed. 1948) , Lecturer on Taxation, Dickinson Law School.

The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Albert H. Gold,
Esquire.
1. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), 39 STAT. 756 (1916).
2. United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
3. IT. REV. CODE § 811(c).
4. Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(c), 44 STAT. 9 (1926).
5. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 (1932).
6. Revenue Act of 1932, § 803(a), 47 STAT. 169 (1932) ; INT. REV. CODE § 811(c).
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included in the gross estate of a decedent, the value of property at the timt of
his death:
"To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of ...

his death ...

except in case

of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Any transfer of a material part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or
distribution thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death without
such consideration, shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death .... "
The relinquishment within two years prior to his death of a power of revocation or amendment in respect to property transferred during the decedent's lifetime, which, if retained, would have subjected the property to
estate tax, is also presumed to be a transfer in contemplation of death to
7
the extent of each beneficiary's interest in excess of $5,000.00.
Scope of the Statute
It is axiomatic that the decedent must own the property which he transfers
before the statutory provisions can apply. Thus, where a decedent renounced
certain legacieg, no part of such legacies was includible in his estate, even
though the renunciation may have been made in contemplation of death.8
On the other hand, the fact that the decedent in his lifetime parted absolutely
with his title to, and possession and enjoyment of, the property is of no consequence.9
The constitutionality of this provision has been upheld as to a transfer
made prior to enactment of the estate tax.' 0
Transfers of Community Property
The 1948 Revenue Act repealed all the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code dealing with the Federal estate taxation of community property which
were first inserted by the 1942 Revenue Act. Thus, the applicability of Sec.
811 (d) (5) of the Code which dealt with transfers of community property
in contemplation of death is now limited to transfers made by decedents who
died between October 22, 1942, the effective date of the 1942 Revenue Act,
and December 31, 1947, the effective date of the 1948 Revenue Act. With respect to decedents dying after December 31, 1947, the pre-1942 method of
taxation of community property is restored.
Section 811(d) (5) provided as follows:
7. INT. REV. CODE § 811(d) (4).

8. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. 2d 914 (C. C. A. 6th 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 641

(1933).

9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.16.
10. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup.. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809 (1931).
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...
a transfer of property held as community property by the decedent and surviving spouse.., shall be considered to have been made by the decedent, except such part
thereof as may be shown to have been received as compensation for personal services
actually rendered by the surviving spouse or derived originally from such compensation
or from separate property of the surviving spouse."

Prior to the enactment of Section 811(d) (5), only one-half of the
property was includible in the gross estate of a decedent who joined with his
spouse in transferring community property in contemplation of death, regardless of the source of the property. Since the repeal of Section 811 (d) (5), this
taxability.
is again the measure of
I
Definition of Contemplation of Death
The Regulations attempt to supply the definition of "contemplation of
death" which is lacking in the Code. Based largely on the comprehensive discussion of broad principles by Chief Justice Hughes in United States v.
Wells," Regulations 105, Section 81.16 declares:
"The phrase 'contemplation of death,' as used in the statute, does not mean, on the
one hand, that general expectation of death such as all persons entertain, nor, on the
other, is its meaning restricted to an apprehension that death is imminent or near. A
transfer in contemplation of death is a disposition of property prompted by the thought

of death (though it need not be solely so prompted). A transfer is prompted by the
thought of death if it is made with the purpose of avoiding the tax, or as a substitute
for a testamentary disposition of the property, or for any other motive associated with
death . .

From this language, it is clear that "contemplation of death" carries far
beyond the narrow limits embraced by the common law concept of gifts
causa mortis. No imminent fear of death is required. It is sufficient if the
decedent was actuated primarily by a motive associated with death. With the
decedent unavailable to establish his motivation, the problem of examining his
state of mind at the time he made a particular gift, to discover his reasons
therefor, is difficult at best. The Regulations provide that the bodily and mental condition of the decedent and all other attendant facts and circumstances
are to be scrutinized to determine whether or not thoughts associated with
death prompted the disposition.' 2 The inquiry, therefore, must be directed
to the myriad of circumstantial factors attending each gift which may hold
some clue as to what the decedent's motivation may have been. Each case must
be decided in the light of its peculiar factual background.
However, it is possible to recognize several guideposts in the welter of
factual detail which pervades the decisions on this subject.
11. 283 U. S. 102, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).

12. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.16.
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL FACTORS

In most of the decisions the courts have considered evidence of (1) the
decedent's age and physical condition, (2) the size of the transfer involved in
relation to the decedent's total estate at that time and (3) the time interval
which elapsed between the transfer and decedent's death. These factors are
of great importance in reconstructing the state of the decedent's mind at the
time the gift was made. Against this background, the court must examine
the various motives which counsel for the Treasury and the estate contend
actuated the gift and then determine which motive or motives were upper13
most in the decedent's mind.
Age and Physical Condition
The natural inference that arises from a transfer made by a decedent
of advanced age, while suffering from serious illness, will be difficult to overcome. The element of old age alone may be counteracted by evidence of mental outlook, business interest and physical activities. But illness is a more
troublesome obstacle. Nevertheless, if clearcut proof of motives associated
with life can be adduced, the factors of age and health will not be controlling.1 4 At the same time, evidence that the donor was not of advanced years
and in good health may be successfully contradicted by proof that he acted
pursuant to a motive associated with death.' 5
Size of Transfer
The ratio between the size of the particular transfer and the then value
of the decedent's entire estate is important as a possible indication that the
transfer was actually a substitute for testamentary disposition. The larger
the proportionate value of the gift, the more persuasive is the implication
that thoughts of death were in the donor's mind. However, this'element
alone is likewise not conclusive. Thus, family precedent and other "life" motives were able to destroy the inference arising from an inter vivos transfer
of practically the entire estate of the decedent. 16
Time Interval
As for the factor of time interval between the gift and the decedent's
death, its chief importance is to invoke the statutory presumption that trans13. PoLIsHER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING 68-72 (2d ed. 1948).
14. Lippincott v. Commissioner, 72 F. 2d 788 (C. C. A. 3d 1934).
15. See Slifka v. Johnson, 63 F. Supp. 289 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 161 F. 2d 467
(C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 758 (1947), where the express motive for
the gift made by the decedent when forty-five years of age was the desire to avoid estate
taxes.
16. Theodora C. Topliffe, 39 B. T. A. 13 (1939).
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fers within two years prior to death were made in contemplation of death.
Beyond that, a short interval may imply that death was contemplated; 17 and,
conversely, a long interval would indicate the absence of death motivation. 18
But it must be remembered that this is only one of the numerous circumstantial factors that will be'considered and may be overcome by other more
persuasive evidence. 19
In practice, the two-year presumption does not impose any burden of
proof upon the taxpayer which he would not otherwise have had. It merely
increases the probability that the Commissioner will assess a deficiency in the
case of such transfers. Regardless of when the transfer was made, once the
issue is submitted to a court, the burden of proof falls upon the taxpayer to
overcome the usual presumption of the correctness of the Commissioner's
determination. 20 It is only where the question of contemplation of death is
raised for the first time after court proceedings have begun that the Commissioner must carry the burden. And even there, once a prima facie case is
2
established, the burden of proving "life" motives shifts to the taxpayer. '
The practical test, in court, is whether decedent's representatives can assemble
sufficient evidence of motives associated with life to overcome the Commissioner's determination.
MOTIVES ASSOCIATED WITH LIFE

A vast variety of motives have been submitted to the courts for evaluation. In determining which of these are associated with life and which with
death, reference is invariably made to the language of the Wells case:
"Death must be 'contemplated,' that is, the motive which induces the transfer must
be of the sort which leads to testamentary disposition. ...If it is the thought of death,
as a controlling motive prompting the disposition of property, that affords the test,
it follows that the statute does not embrace gifts inter vivos which spring from a different motive. . . .As illustrating transfers found to be related to purposes associated
with life, rather than with the distribution of property in anticipation of death, the
Government mentions transfers made for the purpose of relieving the donor of the
cares of management or in order that his children may experience the responsibilities
of business under his guidance and supervision. The illustrations are useful but not
exhaustive. The purposes which may be served by gifts are of great variety. It is common knowledge that a frequent inducement is, not only the desire to be relieved of responsibilities, but to have children, or others who may be the appropriate objects of
the donor's bounty, independently established with competencies of their own, without
being compelled to await the death of the donor and without particular consideration
17. McClure v. Commissioner, 56 F. 2d 548 (C. C. A. 5th 1932), cert. denied, 287
U. S. 609 (1932).
18. Estate of Mary W. Cushman, 40 B. T. A. 948 (1939), appeal dismissed, (C. C. A.

2d 1940).

19. See Slifka v. Johnson, 63 F. Supp. 289 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd, 1.61 F. 2d 467
(C. C. A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 758 (1947).
20. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 (1932).
21. Estate of NathMie Koussevitsky, 5 T. C. 650 (1945).
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of that event. There may be the desire to recognize special needs or exigencies or to

discharge moral obligatiohs. The gratification of such desires may be a more compelling motive than any thought of death." "

Often, the evidence indicates that the decedent may have had several
motives for making a particular transfer. Where the decedent was motivated
by thoughts of life as well as those of death, the type which was dominant or
controlling will determine whether the transfer is taxable as one made in
23
contemplation of death.
Motives which have been recognized by the courts as being associated
with continuance of life include the following: the desire to teach one's children how to handle money and to avoid the annoyance of their frequent money
demands; 24 to induce children to enter the business of the parent, or to remain in such business ;25 to relinquish active control of one's affairs and retire
to the enjoyment of a life of ease ;26 to provide security for transferor's family in the face of business uncertainties or in anticipation of a speculative venture ;27 to provide a means of support for a divorced daughter and her family ;28 to secure a husband's debt ;29 to enable donor's husband, a man of modest
circumstance, to meet his increased expenses after their marriage ;3o to improve the financial circumstances of his children so that they could live comfortably, educate their children and experience the responsibilities of business under his guidance and supervision ;31 to induce brothers not to contest
the will under which donor inherited the property ;32 to procure competent
management for donor's 'property ;33 to provide one's wife with an independent
income;34 to reimburse wife for her financial losses suffered as a result of
the stock market crash, satisfy her desire for a country home, and escape personal liability as stockholder for corporation income tax ;35 to be rid of vacant
22. United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
23. United States v. Wells, supra note 22; Omaha National Bank v. O'Malley, 69
F. Supp. 354 (D. Neb. 1946).
24. Estate of Robert Wetherill, 36 B. T. A. 1259 (1937), appeal dismissed, (C. C. A.
3d 1938).

25. Willcuts v. Stoltze, 73 F. 2d 868 (C. C. A. 8th 1934); Estate of D. I. Cooper,
7 T. C. 1236 (1946).
26. Tait v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 74 F. 2d 851 (C. C. A. 4th
1935).
27. Colorado National Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S.23, 59 Sup. Ct. 48, 83 L.
Ed. 20 (1938).
28. Estate of John B. Bryan, 1 T. C. M. 1030 (1943).
29. Estate of Sarah H. Bradley, 2 T. C. M. 609 (1943).

30. Estate of Genevieve B. Macaulay, 3 T. C. 350 (1944).

31. Estate of B. H. Kroger, 2 T. C. M. 644 (1943), aff'd, 145 F. 2d 901 (C. C. A.

6th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S.866 (1945).
32. Estate of Elsie D. Rothschild, 3 T. C. M. 143 (1944).
33. Estate of Mary W. Cushman, 40 B. T. A. 948 (1939), appeal dismissed, (C. C. A.
2d 1940).
34. McGregor v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 948 (C. C. A. 1st 1936); Estate of R. 0.
Howard, 9 T. C. 1192 (1947).
35. Estate of George H. Burr, 4 T. C. M. 1054 (1945), appeal dismissed, (C. C. A.

2d 1947).
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and unproductive property ;36 to present a son with a wedding gift ;37 to make
gifts of U. S. Savings Bonds to children in place of customary birthday and
Christmas gifts ;38 to provide for daughters as they approached marriageable
age, place property out of the reach of possible Nazi pressure, and hedge
against possible wartime restrictions;39 to carry out decedent's well established custom of making gifts, even though the gifts in question were made at
age 87 and within two months of death ;40 to save income taxes, gift taxes and
state property taxes;41 and.to avoid an increase in gift tax rates.4 2 On the
other hand, transfers admittedly made for the purpose of avoiding the estate
43
tax are generally held to have been made in contemplation of death.
TRANSFERS TO DISCHARGE MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Among the motives which have been held to indicate thoughts of life,
rather than of death, are those which are concerned with the discharge of
moral obligations. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, writing the opinion for the
Supreme Court in United States v. Wells, 44 specifically named this type of
motive as one of the desires whose gratification "may be a more compelling
motive than any thought of death." The decisions of the courts illustrate a
variety of moral obligation situation§.
Thus, transfers were held not to have been made in contemplation of
death where they were prompted by a desire to relieve the donor of a moral
duty to support certain collateral relatives ;45 to fulfill an ante-nuptial promise
to turn over property to the transferor's second wife which would give her
an independent income;46 to express the transferor's appreciation to his wife
and son for their faithful attendance upon him during his illness and hospitalization ;47 or to reward children for their assistance to the donor in managing his farms. 48
Where a decedent, who had adhered rigorously to a rule of impartiality
in making gifts to his children, felt obliged to make compensating transfers
36. Estate of John Moir, 47 B: T. A. 765 (1942).

37. Guinzburg v. Anderson, 54 F. 2d 629 (C. C. A. 3d 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S.
553 (1932).
38. Estate of G. C. Mills, 5 T. C. M. 768 (1946).

39. Estate of Julius Bloch-Sulzberger, 6 T. C. M. 1201 (1947).
40. Estate of Louis Schumacher, 2 T. C. M. 1018 (1943).
41. Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 Sup. Ct., 78, 80 L. Ed.
35 (1935).
42. Fair v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 801 (W. D. Pa. 1945).
43. Estate of Frank A. Vanderlip, 3 T. C. 358 (1944), af'd, 155 F. 2d 152 (C. C. A.

2d 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 728 (1946) ; Estate of E. R. Rickenberg, 11 T. C. No. 1
(1948).
44. 283 U. S. 102, 119, 51 Sup. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931).
45. Estate of B. H. Kroger, 2 T. C. M. 644 (1943), aff'd, 145 F. 2d 901 (C. C. A.
6th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. ,866 (1945).
46. Mary W. Boggs, 11 B. T. A. 824 (1928).
47. Estate of J.*F. Lohman, Sr., 6 T. C. M. 1071 (1947).
48. Estate of H. M. Springer,.45 B. T. A. 561 (1941).
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to all his children when financial aid to a widowed daughter became necessary,
such transfers were held not includible as transfers in contemplation of
death;49 and, similarly, where a trust was created for the benefit of a son
because of the transferor's desire to compensate this son for great expenditures already made for the education and financial establishment of another
child. 50
Also held not to have been made in contemplation of death were transfers
of stock to children, induced by the transferor's feeling that she was obligated
to comply with the desire of her deceased husband, from whom she received
the stock, that it be kept in the family ;51 as were transfers of life insurance
motirated by the transferor's belief that money he had received under certain
2
other policies was morally that of the donees.6
The mere presence of one of these "moral obligation" motives in the
mind of the donor at the time of his transfer will not effectively rebut a presumption of contemplation of death. As in all other situations, it must be
established that this motive, or another "life" motive was dominant.
TRANSFERS INTERRELATED OR SIMULTANEOUS

WITH

WILL

In many contemplation of death cases, the Commissioner has contended
that the decedent's will, or codicil thereto, was so closely related to the
transfers in question that there existed a controlling testamentary motive on
the part of the decedent in making such transfers. Where the will and the
transfers were executed contemporaneously, or substantially so, and together
created an integrated plan for testamentary disposition of the decedent's
property, the transfers have been declared to be in contemplation of death.
This rationale prevailed where the decedent conveyed a valuable piece
of real estate to Northwestern University as an endowment fund for scholarships in return for certain annuities to himself and a number of his relatives
and friends. On the same day, the decedent executed his will, leaving his
entire estate to the same scholarship foundation for identical purposes, reciting therein that he was making no bequests or devises to friends and
relatives because he had "already made provision for them in another manner
during his life time." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the
Board of Tax Appeals, held that the two instruments constituted a final
scheme of complete distribution of the decedent's estate and that the annuities provided by the agreement were made in contemplation of death, 3
49. R. B. White, 21 B. T. A. 500 (1930).

50. First National Bank of Birmingham v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N. D.
Ala. 1939).
51. Estate of Annie T. Stincbfield, 4 T. C. M. 511 (1945).
52. Boyle Trust and Investment Co. v. United States, 4 P-H 1943 FED. TAX SFRV.
62,530 (D. C. Tenn. 1943).
53. Purvin v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 929 (C. C. A. 7th 1938), cert. denied, 305

U. S. 626 (1938).
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Similarly, where the decedent made gifts of stock shortly after executing
a codicil to his will with closely related provisions ;54 so, too, where a transfer
of life insurance policies in trust was executed at the same time as decedent's
revised will and together with the will represented a complete plan for disposition of her estate upon death. 55
Moreover, in situations where a considerable period of time has elapsed
between execution of the decedent's inter vivos transfers and his will, a clear
interdependence of the two instruments has induced the courts to subject the
transfers to estate tax as being' in contemplation of death.
Thus, a transfer in trust by the decedent, aged 82, which contained practically identical conditions and named the same beneficiaries as a will executed
six yeais previously by the decedent, was held to be in contemplation of
56
death.
So, also, where the decedent had transferred irrevocably insurance
policies on his life to a trustee eleven years before the making of his last will.
The trust was for the benefit of decedent's sons and their descendants and
specifically provided that it had been created to aid decedent's executors in
administering his estate. From this language and the provisions of the will,
the court found that the only purpose for creating the trust was a testamentary
one-to provide the executors with necessary funds. The insurance transfers
were held taxable as having been made in contemplation of death. 5" But a
will executed four years after an inter vivos transfer of stock in trust and
making parallel disposition of the decedent's property was held not sufficiently
contemporaneous to indicate a testamentary motive in creating the trust,
especially where a compelling motive associated with life was present. 58
A rather unusual situation arose in Pate v. Comissioner.59 There, the
decedent made a joint will with his first wife by the terms of which the survivor was to give certain real property to Pate, a nephew of the wife. After
the death of his first wife, and just prior to a second marriage, the decedent
conveyed the specified property to Pate, subject to the reservation of a life
interest. Although he survived for eleven years following this transfer, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the decedent's controlling motive
in making the transfer was his desire to carry out the provisions of the joint
will-a continuing testamentary motive.
The effect of the simultaneous or interrelated transfer as evidencing
thoughts of death, can, however, be overcome by evidence tending to prove
54. The Travelers Bank and Trust Co., 29 B. T. A. 88 (1933).
55. Estate of A. R. Davidson, 4 T. C. M. 972 (1945), aff'd, 158 F. Zd 239 (C. C. A,
10th 1946) ; Estate of Barneth Satuloff, 6 T. C. M. 1246 (1947).
56. Estate of Alice B. Davis v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. M. 476 (1943), aff'd, 142 F.
2d 450 (C. C. A. 6th 1944).
57. Estate of William E. Sloan v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
58. Estate of T. M. Flynn, 3 T. C. M. 1287 (1944).
59. 149 F. 2d 669 (C. C. A. 8th 1945).
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that the decedent's primary motive for the transfer was one associated with
life. Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's finding that a transfer was made in contemplation of death where the decedent's
motive for the assignment of life insurance policies was his desire to protect
his family from the consequences of a possible business failure, despite the
similarity of insurance settlement provisions to those of decedent's will. That
the decedent, at the time of the transfers, was an extremely active man of
53 years and in perfect health played no small role in the final result. 60
Similarly, where the execution of a will and transfer to a trust were made
simultaneously, in order to secure to a prospective wife a financial position
similar to the one she would forego under the will of her prior husband, if
she remarried. 61 So, too, inter vivos trusts for children, created at the same
time and with conditions similar to those in the decedent's will, were found
to have been prompted by a desire to provide these children with a regular
income in accordance with an established policy of annual gifts.0 2 Likewise,
transfers of stock in trust, made for the purpose of securing the services of
decedent's son-in-law and effecting family peace were held not in contemplation of death merely because a proposed will was drafted for the decedent's
consideration at the same time that the trust instruments were executed. 63
That the decedent's transfer makes reference to the last will of another
bas been held not to be evidence of a testamentary motivation. Thus, the
decedent, in creating an inter vivos trust, expressed a desire to have the
property of such trust disposed of in accordance with the provisions of a
testamentary trust created under her deceased husband's will. The Tax Court
decided that this reference to the husband's will could have no bearing upon
64
the character of the decedent's own disposition.
The fact that the decedent made certain transfers in trust for the benefit
of his wife and daughter, which were held to be transfers in contemplation
of death, does not necessarily mean that an outright gift made at the same
time to a son to encourage him to take an active interest in the father's business was also in contemplation of death. Where the transfers are separate
and distinct, each must be tested in the light of its own surrounding circumstances and underlying motives.6 5
Summarizing, it appears that transfers which are so closely integrated
with the decedent's will as to represent a comprehensive plan for disposition
60. Estate of A. D. Cronin v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 561 (C. C.A. 6th 1947), rev',

7 T. C. 1403 (1946).
61. Byram, 9 T. C. 1 (1947).
62. Estate of B. P. O'Neal, 6 T. C. M. 713 (1947), aff'd, (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
63. Hofford, 4 T. C. 542 (1945), -modifiedoi; another issue, 4 T. C. 790 (1945), appeal
dismissed, (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
64. Estate of M. E. Girvin v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. M. 1290 (1944), rezvd on another
issue, sub norn., Commissioner v. Bank of California, 155 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 9th 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U. S. 725 (1946), reh. denied, 329 U. S. 827 (1946).

65. Estate of D. I. Cooper, 7 T. C. 1236 (1946).
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of his estate are likely to be held includible in the gross estate as transfers
made in contemplation of death; this, despite a considerable lapse of time
between the execution of the two instruments. Transfers which make reference to the provisions of decedent's will create a strong inference of interrelation and should be avoided. The same precaution should be observed in
respect of the insertion of statements in a will which attempt tor explain the
omission of legacies to persons who received inter vivos gifts. However, the
mere contemporaneous execution of transfer and will is not conclusive of a
testamentary motive on the part of the decedent. Convincing evidence that
a transfer was primarily induced by a motive associated with life will generally forestall a finding of contemplation of death.
ASSIGNMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES AND
RELINQUISHMENT OF RIGHTS THEREUNDER

The taxability of life insurance proceeds for the federal estate tax is
treated under Section" 811(g) of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the
Regulations provide that life insurance proceeds not taxable under Section
811(g) may be includible under some other paragraph of Section 811, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. Cited as examples are
gratuitous assignments of life insurance policies and the relinquishment of
incidents of ownership therein in contemplation of death and thus taxable
under Section 811(c).

66

In general, the same tests which are applied to transfers of other types
of property for determining whether they were made in contemplation of
death will be used for life insurance transfers. However, the inherent testamentary nature of life insurance tends to increase the taxpayer's burden of
establishing life motivation and, consequently, to heighten the likelihood of
such transfers being included in the gross estate.
In a broad sense, it is true that every person who takes out an insurance
policy on his own life is contemplating death. But this does not necessarily
mean that any subsequent transactions involving such a policy will likewise
be of a testamentary character. The decisions indicate that while this inherent
characteristic of life insurance is a factor to be considered,. it does not of
itself conclusively establish that a life insurance transfer was made in contemplation of death. Thus, the Tax Court has said that:
"It is true

. . .

that life insurance policies are inherently testamentary in nature,

but this fact alone does not create an inference that a transferof rights in such policies,
as distinguished from the creation of such rights, is in contemplation of death. Where
the transfer is primarily motivated, as here, by the decedent's preoccupation with
circumstances connected with his life, the transaction does not come within the scope of
the contemplation of death provisions, even though the rights transferred were original66. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.25.
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ly created because the assured realized that at some indefinite time in the future lie
would die." e

Life insurance transfers which have been held not to be in contemplation
of death, because they were actuated primarily by motives commonly associated with life, are illustrated by the following: Where assignments of insurance policies on decedent's life were prompted by his desire to protect his
family from the consequences of a possible business failure ;68 where policies
were transferred'to decedent's first wife pursuant to a separation agreement
and divorce decree and because the decedent desired to rid himself of all
obligations toward her ;69 where the decedent relinquished incidents of ownership because he felt under a moral obligation to make such transfer to the
beneficiaries;70 where the transfer was pursuant to decedent's policy of
making gifts to his children ;71 where policies were assigned to a son because
2
of his straitened financial condition.7
At the same time, it should be noted that the motives usually associated
with death will be as significant in life insurance transfer cases as they are
where other forms of property are concerned. Thus, a decedent's renunciation
of the reserved right to change beneficiaries was held to be in contemplation
of death where his sole motive was to save estate taxes.73 Similarly, a close
integration of insurance transfers with provisions of a simultaneously exe74
cuted will produced a finding of contemplation of death.
Transfers of life insurance in trust that would avoid taxation in the
transferor's estate under Section 811 (c) require careful draftsmanship. Any
provisions which have the effect of postponing or restricting the donee's
enjoyment of policy benefits until donor's death will be closely scrutinized
by the courts as possible indications of testamentary intent.
Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in examining an assignment
of certain life insurance policies in trust, gave considerable weight to the
fact that the transferor had already borrowed all that the insurers would lend
on these policies and that the trustee was required to hold them until the
proceeds became payable.75 Similarly, a finding that an irrevocable transfer
of insurance policies in trust had been made in contemplation of death was
67. Estate of Wilbur B. Ruthrauff, 9 T. C. 418, 427 (1947), now Qn appeal, (C. C. A.

3d) 68. Estate of A. D. Cronin v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 561 (C. C. A. 6th 1947), rczvg
7 T. C. 1403 (1946).

69. George F. Hurd, 9 T. C. 681 (1947).
70. Boyle Trust and Investment Co. v. United States, 4 P-H 1943 FED. TAx SEIv.
62,530 (D. C. Tenn. 1943).
71. Routzahn v. Brown, 95 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 6th 1938).
72. Estate of Charles T. Smith, 1 T. C. M. 518 (1943).
73. First Trust and Deposit Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F. 2d 940 (C. C. A. 2d 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U. S. 744 (1943).
74. Estate of Barneth Satuloff, 6 T. C. M. 1246 (1947).
75. Vanderlip 'v.Commissioner, 155 F. 2d 152 (C. C. A. 2d 1946), aff'g 3 T. C. 358
(1944), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 728"(1946).

19491

TRANSFERS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

207

based in part on the fact that the trustees were not authorized to obtain the
6
cash surrender value or to borrow on the policies, except to pay premiums.7

In holding another life insurance trust includible'in the decedent's estate, the
Tax Court pointed out that although the decedent retained none of the incidents of ownership, the trusts were so designed as to prevent any rights to
the enjoyment of policy'benefits arising until after his death. The spendthrift
provisions in the trust and the fact that the trustee had no power during
decedent's lifetime to exercise any of the rights of ownership, made this
transfer approximate the operation of a testamentary disposition. This factor,
together with integration with the decedent's will, induced the court to con-*
7
clude that the transfer had been madein contemplation of death. "
Moreover, a full release of control and benefits under the transferred
policies may serve to bolster the taxpayer's contention that "life" motives
actuated the transfer. Thus, in reversing the Tax Court and finding -an insurance trust not to have been created in contemplation of death, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals placed considerable emphasis upon the facts that under the
trust decedent had retained no right of reversion or control, that the trustees
could cash in the policies whenever they saw fit and that they could and did
collect dividends during decedent's lifetime,7S
Summarizing, a transfer of life insurance, involving either an assignment of policies or a relinquishment of certain reserved powers, may be taxed
as a gift in contemplation of death, if it fails to meet the ordinary "lifemotive" test. The inherent testamentary character of life insurance will increase, to some extent, the taxpayer's burden of establishing such motivation.
However, this burden is not insurmountable. In cases of transfers of insurance in trust, the taxpayer's position will be considerably weakened by
evidence that full control and enjoyment of policy benefits were not granted
to the trustee or beneficiary under the trust.
VALUATION OF TRANSFERS IN

CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

The general rule of valuation for federal estate taxes that all property
includible in the gross estate shall be valued as of the date of decedent's
death (or the optional valuation date, one year later, under Section 811(j)),
is applicable to property transferred prior to death but later included in the
gross estate as having been made in contemplation of death. The value at the
9
date of the transfer is not material.7
76. Estate of William E. Sloan v. Commissioner, 168 F. 2d 470 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
77. Rhodes, 6 T. C. M. 174 (1947).
78. Flick v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 733 (C. C. A. 5th 1948), reh. denied, (C. C. A.
5th Apr. 16, 1948), rev'g 6 T. C. M. 72 (1947).
79. INT. REV. CODE § 811(c); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.15; Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 704 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. 2d 476 (C. C. A. 4th
1930). See also POLISHER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING 231-349 (2d ed.

1948), for detailed explanation of Valuation and Optional Valuation.
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Should the gifted property be retained by the donee, in its original form
and quantity, until the time of decedent's death, this rule is not difficult of
application. However, where the property, during the interim, has been converted into other forms, or has been improved or consumed by the donee, or
has enhanced in value through accumulations of income, more complex
problems of valuation arise.
What will be the effect of improvements to the transferred property
made by the transferee? The Regulations provide that in determining valuation for estate tax purposes " . . if the transferee has made additions to the
property, or betterments, the enhanced value of the property due thereto
should not be included." 80
There is some doubt as to the precise scope of the language "additions
to the property, or betterments," but indications are that it will be narrowly
construed. In a case which involved a revocable trust, the Board of Tax
Appeals declared that this phrase in the Regulations evidenced an intention
to limit the exclusion -to buildings or other physical properties; that where
the trustees merely sold the trust corpus at a profit and invested the proceeds
in other property, this did not amount to "additiohs" or "betterments." 81
Thus, it would appear that enhancement in the value of the inter vivos
gift which results frQm wise reinvestment will not escape taxation. The Tax
Court has flatly rejected the contention that the value of trust corpora, includible in decedent's gross estate as transfers in contemplation of death,
should not exceed the value as of the date of death of the assets actually
transferred by the decedent to the trjists. On the contrary, the court ruled
that where the transferred property has been converted into other property,
the value of such other property at the date of death is the measure of the
tax; that this rule would apply whether the property transferred in contempla82
tion of death were transferred to a trust or outright.
It is difficult to reconcile this approach with the decision recently announced by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in a case where the decedent
made sizable cash gifts to his sons in contemplation of death. The sons lost
one-half of this money in a speculative venture prior to the transferor's
death; nevertheless, the entire sum transferred was held includible in the
decedent's gross estate. In support of its conclusion, the court said: "The
evident purpose [of Regulations 105, Section 81.15] is to make the transferred property cause the same tax result as if the decedent had kept it till
he died instead of transferring it." 83
80. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.15.
81. Guggenheim v. Helvering, 40 B. T. A. 181 (1939), modified and aff'd, 117 F. 2d
469 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 621 (1941).
82. Kroger v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. M. 644 (1943), aff'd, 145 F. 2d 901 (C. C. A.
6th 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 866 (1945).
83. Estate of A. P. Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 1, 2 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
cert. denied, 332 U. S. 817 (1947).
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It has been suggested that these two cases indicate judicial support of
a Treasury policy which makes a distinction between outright transfers, as
84
in'the Humphrey case, and transfers in trust, as in the Kroger case. Such
a policy would treat the trust corpus as -an entity, without regard to the
specific assets which comprise it, and thus evaluate the corpus, in whatever
form it may exist, on the date of the transferor's death. However, there are
no published rulings to confirm the existence of such a Treasury policy. One
cannot be certain that the Commissioner might not urge the application of
the Humphrey rationale to a trust whose corpus had been reduced, rather
than increased, through reinvestment.
The question of how to treat accumulations of income, earned by the
85
transferred property prior to death, arose in Estate of James E. Frizzel.
Decedent had created an irrevocable trust in contemplation 6f death for the
sole benefit of an incompetent son and directed the trustee to accumulate all
undistributed income. The Commissioner included in the gross estate the
total value of the trust corpus at the date of death (then consisting of the
original corpus, increments of corpus resulting from investment of undistributed income and cash not yet invested). The Tax Court, however, held
that only the property actually transferred to the trust by the decedent was
includible. It recognized this as a case of first impression and distinguished
it from a line of other cases in which the value of'the entire corpus at time
of death was subjected to estate tax liability. The distinction rested on the
ground that the Frizzell frust instrument provided for no retention of interest
in the decedent so that the inter vivos gift was completed in every respect
during his lifetime and was not affected by his death; while in all the cases
which had reached the opposite result, the transferor had reserved certain
strings of interest or control up to the time of his death, so that the gift was
86
not fully completed until death.
It is interesting that in the course of its opinion the Tax Court referred
to the "additions or betterments" provision of Regulations 105, Section 81.15
but declined to consider its application in the absence of any administrative
interpretation on the subject. However, the net effect of its decision was to
create a similar exclusion for income accumulation.
Also worthy of note is the following broad statement which appears
in the Frizzell opinion:
"Therefore, we think that where transfer of property has been completed during
life and the death of the grantor does not operate upon the completion of the transfer,
.the estate tax is measured by the value of the property which the decedent transferred
TRUSTS AND GiFTs, 1947-48, p.
567. 84. See MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES-ESTATES,
85. 9 T. C. 979 (1947), reconsideredand aff'd, 11 T. C. No. 69 (1948).

86. See Guggenheim and Helvering, 40 B. T. A. 181 (1939), modified and aft'd, 117
F. 2d 469 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 621 (1941).
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to a trust, only, and the tax is not measured by other property in the trust when death
occurs." .7

Taken at face value, this statement of the Tax Court appears to reverse
that court's earlier position in the Kroger case. One can only conjecture as
to whether future decisions will so construe it or whether its effect will be
limited to the Frizzell situation, i.e., enhanced value of corpus arising from
undistributed income accumulations.
Contradictory as these valuation decisions in contemplation of death cases
may appear, there is nevertheless emerging a faintly discernible trend. When
fully matured, this trend may find valuation at date of death (or optional
valuation date) based solely on the original property transferred, whether
given outright or in trust, and without regard to any diminution or enhancement of corpus resulting from reinvestment. Thus, the transfer would be
taxed in the gross estate as if the donor had retained the specific property in
his possession, unchanged except for age and market fluctuations, till the
date of his death.
LOOKING AHEAD

During the second session of the 80th Congress, H. R. 6712, known as
the. Revenue Revision Bill of 1948, was approved by the House of Representatives but was not acted upon by the Senate. Section 204 of the Bill
affected transfers in contemplation of death. It provided that any transaction,
other than a bona fide sale, vwde within three years of the decedent's death
shall be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death, unless shown
to the contrary; but no transfers made prior to such three-year period shall
be deemed or held to have been made in contemplation of death. Aside from
increasing, from two to three years, the period during which the prima facie
presumption would be operative, this section sought to bar the Commissioner
from attacking transfers in this category where they were made more than
three years prior to the decedent's death. The decisions of the courts are
replete with instances where transfers made many years before the decedent's
death have been included, nevertheless, in his gross estate as transfers in
contemplation of death. It was this situation which seems to have been the
primary motivation for the proposed amendment. If enacted into law, this
section would establish a definite line of cleavage which would determine
the incidence of taxation for transfers in contemplation of death.
The political complexion of the new Congress raises serious doubts as to
the fate of the Revenue Revision Bill of 1948. Some of the amendments proposed by it will undoubtedly be supported by the Treasury and be adopted by
87. 9 T. C. 979, 988 (1947), reconsideredand aff'd, 11 T. C. No. 69 (1948).
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the Congress. It is not likely, however, that Section 204 will be one of the favored provisions.
At the same time, this change in the political make-up of the new Congress may lend support to the recent proposals for integration of the estate
and gift taxes into a single transfer tax and its correlation with the income
88
tax.
In general, this plan would replace the dual gift and estate tax system now
in operation with a single transfer tax on "completed" gifts. Thus, inter vivos
transfers which were complete during the lifetime of the transferor would
not be includible in his gross estate, but would be taxed at the time of their
completion. On the other hand, where the transferor failed to make a com-.
plete gift during his lifetime, either through retention of benefits or control of
the subject matter of the transfer, the property involved would be taxed in
his gross estate at his later death when the transfer became complete. The incidence of tax on the income from transferred property would also hinge on
completion of the gift. With such a scheme of taxation, the need for determining whether a transfer had been made in contemplation of death would be
eliminated.8 9 The 80th Congress gave no consideration to this proposal and
the attitude of its leaders was clearly hostile to its enactment. There has been,
also, considerable opposition to the transfer tax concept from sources friendly
to the present administration. The fate of integration still hangs very much in
the balance.
88. See Report of the Advisory Committee of the Treasury, entitled,
AND

GIFT TAXES:

TAX

A

PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND CORRELATION

FEDERAL ESTATE

WITH THE INCOME

(1947).

89. See POLISHER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING 596-604 (2d ed. 1948).

